2023/2 – Testimonianza e diritto

The essay first examines the structural elements of the evidence evaluation activity, and then focuses on testimonial evidence. In light of the epistemological and psychological aspects of testimony in general, the function and forms – immediate and mediated – of the testimonial statement are examined. The investigation continues by focusing on the specific object and methods of evaluating witness evidence, with attention to the burdens of motivation and the possibilities of its control in the phases of appealing the sentence.

Keywords: Evaluation of the Evidence – Testimony – Testimonial Evidence – Witness – Evaluation of Testimonial Evidence

Testimonial hearsay evidence aroues distrust in criminal trials for two different reasons. First, because the second-degree statement is not directly concerned with the facts that must be proved (whether or not it should be considered a “circumstantial” evidence in the technical sense). Secondly, because the first-degree witness is not required to tell the truth, does not speak in front of the judge and does not answer the questions of the trial parties. The Author wonders whether and to what extent evidence like this is admissible in an evidentiary law system such as the Italian one, in which, following the introduction of art. 111 paragraph 4 of the Constitution, the paradigm of testimonial evidence is represented by the oral statement made in court and subject to cross-examination.

Keywords: Criminal Proceedings – Due Process of Law – Testimonial Evidence – Hearsay Rule –
Cross-Examination

Appraising the worth of others’ testimony is always complex; appraising the worth of expert testimony is even harder; appraising the worth of expert testimony in a legal context is harder yet. Legal efforts to assess the reliability of expert testimony – I’ll focus on evolving U.S. law governing the admissibility of such testimony – seem far from adequate, offering little effective practical guidance. My purpose in this paper is to think through what might be done to offer courts more real, operational help. The first step is to explain why the legal formulae that have evolved over the years may seem reassuring, but aren’t really of much practical use. The next is to suggest that we might do better not by amending evidentiary rules but by helping judges and attorneys understand what questions they should ask about expert evidence. I focus here on (i) epidemiological testimony, and (ii) the process of peer review.

Keywords: Evidence Law – Expert Testimony – Reliability – Peer Review – The Daubert-JoinerKumho Régime.

We aim to contribute to the solution to the “garbage problem”, namely, how to distinguish knowledge from garbage, and why, despite the fact that most of the time people are agile at the distinction, they fail in high-stakes cases. We discuss this problem in the context of jurisprudential discussions over the concept of testimony. In Section 2 we focus on traditional solutions in the law: burdens of proof and expert testimony. Section 3 focuses on the distinction between knowing-how and knowing that; Section 4 addresses the role of biases in decision-making and connects this to the garbage problem; Section 5 concludes by analysing the relation between knowledge and the types of thinking that can generate biases. In a nutshell, our claim is that identifying the relevant biases and types of knowledge helps identify garbage transmission.

Keywords: Biases – Epistemology – Evidence – Factfinding – Testimony.

In this necessarily brief overview of psychological research on cognitive processes in testimony, I report their potential negative influence on the accuracy of witness reports, and the consequences on the validity of testimony as evidence in a court of law. While perception and memory processes can interfere with the accuracy of the content of witness reports, reasoning processes can easily lead to decisions that are not fully rational, being affected by variables outside of one’s conscious awareness. Some of the risks involved are described, briefly discussing their effect on the principles of immediacy and orality, and highlighting the importance of correct interviewing techniques, as well as the necessity to become aware of the most common reasoning fallacies, as protective factors.

Keywords: Eyewitness Testimony – Memory – Lineup – Interviewing Techniques – Reasoning and Decision Making

Given the risks of misinformation, addressees need to calibrate their trust towards communicators effectively. One way to do this is to evaluate the evidence speakers rely on (their evidential warrant) or claim to have (their evidential claims) when providing testimony. We review key findings in experimental psychology and experimental pragmatics to uncover the mechanisms underlying this form of trust calibration. This will ultimately shed light on the psychological foundations of principles that guide the evaluation of testimony in legal contexts, such as the law against hearsay.

Keywords: Epistemic Vigilance – Calibration – Trust – Confidence – Evidentiality.

Applied Epistemology è un volume collettaneo che si situa dichiaratamente in una collocazione interstiziale (p. 5), in quel gap metodologico che sussiste, di fatto, tra epistemologia “tradizionale” ed epistemologia applicata. Per epistemologia “tradizionale” si intende il metodo epistemologico discendente dalle speculazioni cartesiane e dalla tradizione anglosassone che fa capo a Locke e a Hume e che ha trovato sistematizzazione, per altri versi, nella prima critica kantiana. L’epistemologia applicata può, invece, essere ricondotta alle epistemologie “critiche” sviluppatesi nell’epoca postcoloniale. Applied Epistemology si pone in questa posizione perché, pur essendo costituito da contributi che condividono tutti la seconda impostazione, offre al lettore temi che impongono un confronto e/o uno scontro con l’epistemologia tradizionale. I diciannove saggi affrontano questioni controverse da un punto di vista storico, ideologico ed epistemologico. Essi spaziano dalla sperimentazione animale (p. 67) al tema dei torti doxastici (p. 99), dalle ingiustizie epistemiche (pp. 151, 171, 193, 215) alla violenza psicologica (p. 119), dalla questione razziale (p. 193) alla cultura femminista (pp. 253, 283), dal consenso medico e sessuale (pp. 305, 321, 348) alle sfide poste all’agente epistemico dallo sviluppo tecnologico (pp. 389, 410, 437, 457). Il volume è d’interesse per la filosofia del diritto e per chi studia il fenomeno testimoniale poiché presenta questioni attinenti alla valorizzazione di elementi e punti di vista (come la posizionalità incarnata, la razza, la condizione di oppressione) che non sempre ricevono un’adeguata attenzione nei lavori di quei teorici del diritto che seguono un metodo epistemologico tradizionale. Tutti i testi del volume, in linea col metodo dell’epistemologia applicata, ne condividono due aspetti fondamentali: 1) il fine di incidere in modo significativo sul cambiamento di qualche realtà sociale (così per es. il contributo di Dotson e Sertler) e, 2), l’attenzione per l’agency epistemica (così i contributi di Lackey, Gunn e Lynch). Tali aspetti appariranno in maniera evidente muovendosi attraverso le sette sezioni in cui Applied Epistemology è diviso: Epistemological perspectives; Epistemic and doxastic wrongs; Epistemology and injustice; Epistemology, race, and the academy; Epistemology and feminist perspectives; Epistemology and sexual consent; Epistemology and the internet. In queste sezioni il lettore incontrerà lavori sia di taglio più generale che di taglio più specifico e settoriale.